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In an earlier article, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence,1 I developed a
taxonomy of meanings for the idea of 'judicial independence" that draws on the
distinction between negative and positive concepts of liberty. The constraints on
judicial action range along a rough continuum-from those that raise concerns
even under an exclusively negative conception, such as freedom from physical
intimidation or freedom from direct pecuniary consequences, to those that pose
problems only under an extremely robust positive conception, such as freedom
from review by higher courts, freedom to ignore precedents, and freedom to
pursue a conception of the good or the just that contradicts positive law.
In this article, I apply that framework to the litigation surrounding the
presidential election of 2000. I show how that litigation implicated a number of
aspects of judicial independence. With respect to the justices of the Florida
Supreme Court, I consider questions such as the effect of their status as
popularly elected officials, their position within the judicial hierarchy, and the
peculiar relationship among the branches of government in presidential election
cases. With respect to the members of the United States Supreme Court, I discuss
the implications for judicial independence of potential personal stakes in the
outcome of the litigation; individual justices' desire to influence the future
composition of the Court; and the Court's freedom from direct political control.
Finally, I explore ways in which the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore reflects two particularly aggressive and troubling assertions of
judicial independence. First, the Court saw itself as free to determine the
meaning of Florida law for itself, without regard to the views of the Florida
Supreme Court. Second, the per curiam opinion ignored pervasive constraints
on individual judges' ability to pursue their own ends that precedent and stare
decisis normally impose.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Duchess of Windsor famously observed that you can never be too rich or
too thin. Most discussions of judicial independence take a similar stance-there is
no such thing as too much. In an earlier article, Two Concepts of Judicial
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Independence, I suggested that this unanimity reflects a failure to define what
judicial independence means.2 Drawing on Sir Isaiah Berlin's distinction between
negative and positive concepts of liberty,3 I suggested that there are a range of
possible meanings to the term "judicial independence" and that the ones that rest
on a negative conception of autonomy are easier to justify than the ones that adopt
a more positive approach. Indeed, strongly positive versions of judicial
independence not only implicate the familiar countermajoritarian difficulty (when
should courts override the judgments of the democratically elected branches?) but
raise more basic questions about the relationship between judicial power and
other people's freedom. When judges are completely free, the rest of us may not
be.
In this article, I apply the framework developed in Two Concepts to the
litigation surrounding the presidential election of 2000. 4 I describe the various
aspects of judicial independence that came into play and show that arguments
about judicial independence can be deployed by critics on every side, precisely
because the idea of judicial independence is such a slippery one. And I suggest
that the closing act of the drama-the United States Supreme Court's per curiam
decision in Bush v. Gore 5 -constituted an aggressively independent judicial act.
The Supreme Court's decision thus illustrates some of the dangers that come from
elevating judicial independence over the constellation of other values courts also
serve.
II. FROM "FROM" TO "To":
THE RANGE OF UNDERSTANDINGS OF JUDICIAL AUTONOMY
Put in its simplest terms, a negative conception of judicial independence
consists in "warding off interference" 6 from external influences. Under a positive
conception, by contrast, judges are engaged in "conceiving goals and policies of
[their] own and realizing them.' 7 A shorthand way of explaining the distinction
uses the verbal formulations "freedom from" and "freedom to." In a negative
conception, the actor is free from some outside control on her ability to act. In a
2 See id.
3 That distinction is presented in IsAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
4 For extensive accounts of how that litigation unfolded, see, for example, SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RiCHARD H. PILDES, WHEN ELECrIONs Go BAD: THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECrION OF 2000, at 28 (rev. ed. 2001); Larry D.
Kramer, The Supreme Court in Politics, in THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000, at 105 (Jack N.
Rakove ed., 2001).
5 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
6 BERLIN, supra note 3, at 127.
7 Id. at 131.
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positive conception, the actor is free to realize a particular internally generated
goal.
In Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, I described a series of potential
constraints on a judge's autonomy. I arranged them along a rough continuum-
from those that raise concerns even under an exclusively negative conception of
judicial independence to those that pose problems only under an extremely robust
positive conception:
Physical Compulsion
Pecuniary Consequences
Personal Ambition
The Political Branches
The Judge's Own Background
Higher Courts
The Law8
The polar ends of the spectrum can be illustrated by examples of what did not
happen in the presidential election litigation. If, for example, a mob had gathered
around the Florida Supreme Court and had threatened to bum the building down
unless the justices ruled in favor of George W. Bush, that would have implicated
the most negative form of judicial independence: judges must be, and feel
themselves to be, free from physical coercion.9 At the other end of the spectrum:
suppose the United States Supreme Court had announced that the election should
be determined by the popular vote total because the Electoral College reflects an
anachronistic vision of American democracy,' 0 and therefore declared Al Gore
the winner. Such a decision to depart from the constitutional framework-the
"supreme Law of the Land"' --could be justified only by a ludicrously robust
version of judicial autonomy in which judges are free to remake the American
political system without any constitutional warrant. 12 Leaving aside these
8 While I am quite confident that freedom from physical compulsion and freedom to
create the law oneself mark the ends of the spectrum, the relative positions of some of the
intermediate constraints might shift depending on the context. As this essay suggests, in the
context of the presidential election litigation, an argument in favor of judicial independence
from the political branches may involve a more aggressive assertion of autonomy than an
argument ofjudicial independence from ajudge's own background would.
9 Cf JEFFREY TOOBIN, TOO CLOSE TO CALL: THE THIRTY-Six-DAY BATTLE TO DECIDE
THE 2000 ELECTION 156 (2001) (describing how Republican partisans formed "the Brooks
Brothers mob" and stormed a Dade County office building, chased officials down the hall, and
pressed county officials to stop recounting ballots).
10 See Jack N. Rakove, The E-College in the E-Age, in THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF
2000, supra note 4, at 201.
II U.S. CONST. art. VI, § l, cl. 2.
12 In fact, much of the criticism of prior judicial forays into the political thicket has rested
on the contention that the majority has simply enacted its own political preferences. See, e.g.,
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extremes, it turns out that the litigation surrounding the presidential election raises
interesting versions of all of the intermediate constraints.
A. Freedom From Direct Personal Stakes and Pecuniary Consequences
A cornerstone of due process is the understanding that judges must be free
from having a personal interest in the outcome of the cases they hear. 13 If Justices
Scalia or Kennedy thought that their prospects for becoming chief justice
depended on Bush's becoming president,14 and this possibility affected their view
of the merits of Bush v. Gore, then personal ambition would have compromised
judicial independence. If Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Scalia were
influenced in their view of the case by their hope that their children might be
nominated to high government posts in a Republican administration,' 5 this raises
the same problem. Similarly, if Justice O'Connor "wanted to retire to Arizona,
and a Gore win meant [she would] have to wait another four years... [because
she] did not want a Democrat to name her successor," 16 then we might properly
be concerned that her position in Bush v. Gore raises the appearance that she had
an illegitimate stake in the outcome.17 My own view is that all of the jurists
involved in the presidential election litigation were committed to keeping their
personal interests in the outcome of the election from influencing their resolution
of the legal issues before them. As I shall suggest later, however, even if narrow
self-interest did not distort their analysis, the lens through which judges
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 896-903 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 269-70,298-302 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
13 See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57,62 (1972).
14 Cf Tony Mauro, Fractious Episode Likely to Affect Justices 'Future on the Bench, TEX.
LAW., Dec. 18, 2000, at 18, available at LEXIS, Allnews File (remarking that "[J]ustices-
Scalia and Thomas, most notably-who might have had ambitions to be elevated to [C]hief
[J]ustice by a President Bush may have to defer those dreams" because "Democrats would
likely view any elevation of a sitting justice as an unseemly payback for ruling in Bush's
favor'). The accusation that this possibility motivated the justices-that the Supreme Court's
decision was corrupt in the old-fashioned sense of the word-has been raised by observers such
as Alan Dershowitz. See ALAN M. DERSHOWrrZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000, at 162-63 (2001) (suggesting that Justice Kennedy might have been
influenced by his desire to become the next chiefjustice).
15 Janet Rehnquist was nominated and confirmed for the position of Inspector General of
the Department of Health and Human Services. Eugene Scalia, after much controversy,
received a recess appointment as Solicitor of the Department of Labor.
16 According to a story in Newsweek, Justice O'Connor's husband gave this explanation
to other partygoers at an election night party after the Justice expressed distress when CBS
News announced Gore had won Florida. Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, The Truth Behind
the Pillars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 2000, at 46,46.
17 1 discuss this question in more detail infra text accompanying notes 48-52.
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considered the legal claims might have been colored by knowledge about
outcomes.
B. Freedom From Electoral Retribution and a
Judge's Personal Background
The constraints I described in the previous section are unambiguously
illegitimate: Everyone would agree that they should not affect a judge's decision.
But there are other forms of personal ambition that begin to raise the question
whether judicial independence should be unlimited. Most judges want to keep
their current jobs. Given the widespread use of popular elections to choose state
court judges, many discussions of judicial independence focus on the threat to
judicial independence posed by the desire to stay in office. Because the electorate
may retaliate against judges who render unpopular decisions, judges may be
tempted to temper justice with self-preservation.
How we think about this aspect ofjudicial independence may depend on how
we frame the question. If we ask, "Should judges be free from the fear they will
be tossed out of office for making a correct but unpopular decision?," the answer
is sure to be "Yes." Posed this way, the question pushes us back toward the
entirely negative conception of judicial independence that underlies freedom from
physical coercion (conveyed by the metaphorical "tossed out of office") or direct
personal benefit (since electoral defeat will deprive them of the emoluments of
office). Putting the question this way presupposes the existence of cases where
there is a clear legal rule, but either the rule or one of the litigants is unpopular.
The very nature of the judicial act requires that judges not bend the rule because
of popular views about the rule or its application to particular litigants.
But there will be many situations in which either the rule is not clear or the
case calls for judges to exercise equitable discretion. These cases may lead us to
ask the question differently: "Must the voter who believes in judicial
independence disregard a judge's views in deciding how to vote in a retention
election?" It is far more difficult to answer this question with a categorical "Yes."
Consider a voter who disagrees with a judge's approach to key questions of state
constitutional law conceming, for example, the right to privacy) 8 Should that
18 Many state constitutions contain such provisions. See, e.g., FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 23
("Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into
the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein."). The Florida Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the Florida Constitution provides broader privacy rights than the United
States Constitution. See, e.g., Renee B. v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 790 So. 2d
1036, 1039 (Fla. 2001) (reiterating this position); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190-92 (Fla.
1989) (using the Florida constitutional provision to strike down restrictions on minors' access to
abortions that might well have passed muster under federal constitutional principles). In a
similar vein, the Georgia Supreme Court relied on a more capacious reading of the Georgia
Constitution's due process clause to strike down precisely the sodomy statute that the United
2003]
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voter nonetheless feel constrained from voting against her because the judge is
honest and not demonstrably incompetent? Or consider the voter who takes a
fundamentally different view of what equality means. Should he be required to
ignore evidence that a candidate for judicial office takes a narrower (or a broader)
view?19
With these considerations in mind, let us turn to the situation of the Florida
Supreme Court in the Bush v. Gore litigation. Unlike the United States Supreme
Court, the Florida Supreme Court is not insulated from the electorate: its
members must stand for retention every six years.20 Did this difference render the
Florida Supreme Court less independent as a descriptive matter? And should we
care? In general, we might assume that the higher the profile of a case, the greater
the importance of political insulation. But in the distinctive context of post-
election litigation over electoral results, there may be a countervailing argument:
the political accountability of the Florida Supreme Court may have made it a
more appropriate forum for deciding who won Florida's electoral votes.
States Supreme Court upheld against a due process challenge in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986). See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 22 n.3 (Ga. 1998).
19 To give a concrete example, consider In re Petition for Removal of a Chief Judge, 592
So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam). In that case, the Florida Supreme Court removed Judge
John Santora from his position as chief judge of one of the state's judicial circuits because of
statements he had given in a newspaper interview. The Florida Supreme Court did not address
his fitness to continue as a judge. Id. at 671 n.1. In the interview, Judge Santora made the
following comments (among many others):
I would not date a black girl. I would not take one home, my mother would kill me .... I
would not want my children to marry a black or an Asian or a Chinese or a Puerto Rican. I
would not want them to. And they know that. I have friends who are black, we all do. You
have them in your workplace; I've got 'em in my workplace. The best judicial assistant in
this building, one of the best, is a black girl. One of the best, without a doubt. But that's
unusual. One of the best judges is black. One of the worst is black. I think that there is a
difference between a lot of them that they can't overcome. And it's not all of it their fault.
It's the fault of their mothers and their daddies and their ancestors. And our fault. We have
been too good to them. We, the United States Congress. Because they make more money
by staying home on welfare than they do working. And you can't blame 'em. Why give up
$1,500 a month when you can't make but $800 working.
Id. at 673.
Certainly, judges enjoy First Amendment rights. And Judge Santora insisted in the
interview that he set aside his personal views about race when he stepped onto the bench. But
does a commitment to judicial independence really mean that a Florida voter should not
consider Judge Santora's views (or, put more tendentiously, retaliate against him for exercising
his constitutional rights to free speech and freedom of association) in deciding whether to vote
for him?
20 This requirement may have been largely formal: Apparently no justice has ever been
defeated in a retention election. See Kevin P. Connolly, GOP Wants to Tighten Grip on
Supreme Court: Republicans Cowin and Brummer Will Try to Give Future Governors the
Power to Remove Justices, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 21, 2002, at B3.
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The question of electoral accountability is distinct from the issue of
partisanship (which might have been categorized by my earlier taxonomy as
reflecting a judge's personal background). I would expect unanimous support for
the proposition that judges should be free from partisan bias, and not decide cases
based on the political identity of the litigants. The tone of the debate over the
Florida and United States Supreme Courts' decisions illustrates this point. Each
court was criticized for being partisan, that is, for picking interpretations that
favored the electoral prospects of the candidate whose party affiliation the
majority shared. But in a wide-open debate in which virtually every conceivable
position (and then some) was taken by somebody, no one defended either court
by conceding, and then justifying or excusing, political motivations. That is, each
court's supporters staunchly denied charges of partisanship.
Of course, the justices (on both courts) may have been deluding themselves.
As I shall suggest in a moment, the law in this case was hardly clear-cut. There
were a variety of lenses through which to view the various subsidiary legal
questions. Which one a judge selected might well be the unconscious product of
knowledge that one approach would result in victory for the candidate she
favored, while the alternative would result in his defeat. This is one powerful
reason why, to the extent it is possible, cases involving the political process
should be litigated before elections occur, while judges are still behind a veil of
ignorance. When elections are challenged after the fact, every procedural and
substantive decision can be outcome determinative. When the partisan effects of
all potential courses of action are known both to the judges and to the public,
there is a risk that every decision will be publicly perceived as driven by its likely
consequences. Thus, the adjudication of claims that can alter the outcomes of
high-profile elections threatens significant damage to the public's confidence in
judicial independence, whatever the reality.2'
In any event, I have not seen any argument that persuades me that the
Democrats on the Florida Supreme Court were more pervasively yellow dog than
the Republicans on the United States Supreme Court were rock-ribbed. To begin
with, more members of the United States Supreme Court than of the Florida
Supreme Court stood to benefit directly from a decision about who should be the
next president. In the end, a majority of the justices on both courts cast votes
consistent with the immediate interests of the party that had appointed them, but
two Democrats on the Florida Supreme Court and two Republicans on the U.S.
Supreme Court voted against the immediate interests of their party's standard
bearer.
Returning, then, to the question whether the status of the Florida Supreme
Court as an elected body posed a threat to its independence in the presidential
election litigation, I am fairly confident that the answer is "No." It is hard to
identify anything in the Florida Supreme Court's rulings that suggests that its
21 ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN, & PILDES, supra note 4, at 3.
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members were influenced by their prospects for retention. There was no reason to
be. While the Court's decisions spawned creation of groups dedicated to
defeating Justice Harry Lee Anstead and Chief Justice Charles Wells in the 2002
election, that effort quickly died down.22 And its ultimate failure was entirely
foreseeable.23
Still, it is worth asking about the normative significance of the Florida
Supreme Court's status as an elected body. For a variety of reasons, I think this
made the Florida Supreme Court a better, rather than a worse forum, for resolving
the case.
To understand why, it is important to acknowledge that, despite the
vehemence of many partisans, the issues raised. in the litigation were not clear-
cut. 24 To begin with, the three federal constitutional provisions implicated by the
case-Article II, section 1, the Twelfth Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses-had never been
interpreted in an even remotely analogous case. 25 The Electoral Count Act of
1887,26 the federal statute governing the receipt and determination of electoral
votes, had never before been construed, and raised constitutional questions all its
own.27 Moreover, the Florida Election Code was a model of ambiguity: What
22 See Dan Christensen, Merit Retention; PAC's Attack Fizzles: Committee's Effort to
Oust Two Florida Justices Leaves Mysterious Money Trail, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Feb.
25, 2002, at A9.
23 Despite an effort to defeat then-Justice Rosemary Barkett's reelection bid to the Florida
Supreme Court by death-penalty supporters and abortion foes, two groups who knew that their
issues would repeatedly come before the court, Justice Barkett garnered over 60% of the vote in
the closest retention election of recent times. See Claire Cooper, Fla. Court in the Crosshairs:
Gore v. Bush Rancor Leads to Targeting of Justices (and Trial Lawyers), NAT'L L.J., Apr. 9,
2001, at Al.
24 For an extremely thoughtful discussion of the various issues, see Kramer, supra note 4.
25 1 have suggested elsewhere that the concurrence's reliance on Article II, as well as the
majority's assertion that Article II means that there is no affirmative federal right to vote in
presidential elections, may be mistaken in light of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pamela S.
Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment in Bush v. Gore,
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 587 (2001); see also Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How
Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 535 (2001) (setting out a more extensive argument for why section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause require both recognizing a federal right to participate
in presidential elections and a manual recount in Florida).
26 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2000).
27 One example: Article II, section 1, clause 2 provides for a state to appoint its electors
"in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," a phrase that served as one of the
linchpins for attacks on the Florida Supreme Court's decision, since critics argued that the
Florida Supreme Court had usurped the legislature's prerogative in the way it interpreted the
Florida Election Code and fashioned an innovative remedy. By contrast, 3 U.S.C. § 15, which
governs the procedure for handling disagreement between the two Houses of Congress over
which slate to accept from a particular state, provides that "the votes of the electors whose
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counts as a legal vote?28 Can a manual recount be triggered by an "error in vote
tabulation"--that is, an error in determining the candidates' vote totals-if there
has been no "error in the vote tabulation system"-that is, no mechanical failure
in the vote counting machinery? 29 When one provision of Florida law provides
that the Secretary of State "shall" ignore late-filed election returns in certifying
election results, while a later-enacted provision states that the Secretary "may"
ignore such returns, which section controls, and, if the latter one does, under what
circumstances may the Secretary ignore late filings? 30 Which aspects of the
requirements for absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots are mandatory
(thereby requiring the rejection of noncompliant ballots) and which are merely
"directive," allowing such ballots to be counted?31 When is a ballot (like the
notorious "butterfly ballot" used in Palm Beach County, which on virtually every
account deprived Al Gore of at least 1700 votes) sufficiently defective that it
requires some judicial remedy?32 When the Florida Election Code provides that a
judge hearing an election contest "may fashion such orders as he or she deems
necessary to ensure that each allegation in the complaint is investigated,
examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged. wrong, and to provide
any relief appropriate under such circumstances," 33 what is an appropriate use of
his or her equitable powers? When the ability of Florida to invoke the protections
appointment shall have been certified by the executive of the State, under the seal thereof, shall
be counted." Thus, in a case where the legislature and the executive disagree, the constitutional
provision and the statute are in tension with one another.
28 Section 101.5614(5) of the Florida Statutes, which has since been repealed, provided in
pertinent part, that "[n]o vote shall be declared invalid or void if there is a clear indication on the
ballot that the voter has made a definite choice as determined by the canvassing board." The
Florida Supreme Court relied on this provision to hold that punchcard ballots on which the
voter failed to completely detach the chad were nonetheless legal votes. See Gore v. Harris, 772
So. 2d 1243, 1256-57 (Fla. 2000). The instructions provided to voters expressly directed voters
to check their ballot cards to be sure no chads were left hanging. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
119 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). This led the three concurring justices to conclude that
ballots that were not machine-readable because they were "not marked in the manner that these
voting instructions explicitly and prominently specify" were not legal votes in the first place.
See id.
29 See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1228-29 (Fla.
2000) (discussing the issue).
30 See id. at 1233-34 (describing and resolving this conflict).
31 See Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000) (allowing
noncompliant absentee ballots to be included in the vote total even though the local election
officials had engaged in inappropriate behavior to assist Republican Party operatives).
32 See Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (per curiam)
(Fla. 2000) (announcing that even if the plaintiffs' allegations were true, the butterfly ballot was
not in "substantial noncompliance" with Florida law, and thus the plaintiffs' challenge of the
Palm Beach County results had failed on a threshold issue).
33 FLA. STAT. § 102.168(8) (2000) (repealed 2002).
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of the federal safe harbor statute34 conflicts with achieving a complete and
accurate count, which should give way? To what extent does the Florida Election
Code reflect the legislature's incorporation of a strong presumption, expressed in
the Florida Constitution's Declaration of Rights,:35 that all election laws should be
construed in favor of "safeguard[ing] the right of each voter to express his or her
will in the context of our representative democracy? '36
Stated another way, the election of 2000 presented questions whose answers
depended on fundamental issues of constitutional philosophy. On the one hand, a
judge might conceive of the right to vote as essentially a creature of state law in
which citizens "must take the bitter with the sweet": 37 if their ballots do not
conform to explicit procedural requirements, they have not cast legal votes, and
any process that threatens to include them in the official total represents judicial
overreaching. If the as-yet uncounted ballots in Florida were not legal votes in the
first place,38 then stopping the recount raises no problems at all. Or a judge might
think that presidential elections are really about how electors appointed pursuant
to state legislative directives select the national chief executive; in such a world,
an individual citizen's right to participate in presidential elections might be
considered contingent,39 while the state's interest in obtaining the safe-harbor
benefits of the Electoral Count Act40 is fundamental. This judge might also fird it
easy to strike a balance in favor of stopping the recount even if that leaves ballots
uncounted.
Conversely, a judge who believes that individual voters possess a
fundamental liberty interest in participating in the presidential election and having
their votes counted 41 might adopt, as either a matter of statutory interpretation or
as a constitutional imperative, a "clear intent of the voter" standard: all ballots
34 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000) (providing that if a state completes its processes for determining its
slate of electors at least six days before the electors cast their ballots, its determination shall be
binding).
35 See FLA. CONST. art. I, §1.
36 Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla. 2000).
37 Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974) (plurality opinion). The Court has
generally rejected the bitter with the sweet approach. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985). Then-Justice Rehnquist, however, championed that approach.
See Arnett, 416 U.S. at 154. Perhaps his concurrence in Bush v. Gore is intended to begin its
rehabilitation.
38 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia &
Thomas, JJ., concurring); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/949trans.pdf (Justice
O'Connor asks "why isn't the standard [for deciding that a ballot contains a legal vote] the one
that voters are instructed to follow, for goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn't be clearer. I mean,
why don't we go to that standard?").
39 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104 (per curiam).
40 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
41 1 explore this issue in Karlan, supra note 25, at 597-99.
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from which a voter's intent can reasonably be ascertained should be included in
the final count, regardless of immaterial departures from state requirements.
Starting from this perspective, a judge might strike the balance between additional
manual recounts and a desire to wrap things up in time for the December 12 safe-
harbor deadline quite differently. Any process that leaves votes uncounted is
justifiable only to the extent that it is necessary to achieve some other compelling
state interest.
Given the difficulty of either determining who received the most legal votes
in Florida or resolving underlying questions about the nature of voting rights
under time constraints and with full awareness of the immediate partisan
consequences, there seem to be good reasons to say that one of the more
politically accountable organs of government should decide who should get
Florida's electoral votes this time around. First, there is a plausible textual
rationale for that approach. Article II, section 1 confers on each "State" (with a
subsidiary delegation to "the Legislature thereof'42) the right to select electors.
Both Article II, section 1 and the Twelfth Amendment expressly anticipate the
counting of electoral votes before Congress. Thus, there is a strong basis for
concluding that post-election contests over a state's electoral votes should be
confided to Congress whenever possible.43
Second, there is something to be said for at least leaving Florida's electorate
with some form of the last word over who deserved the state's electoral votes.
Had the United States Supreme Court deferred entering the fray, then the Florida
Legislature might have acted to appoint a slate of electors. Its decision would
have been subject to review by the citizenry at the next election. Voters who
thought Al Gore had won the election or who thought that the Legislature had
improperly seized control over the selection of electors would have had a
meaningful opportunity to express their views. Similarly, if the Florida Supreme
Court had been left to answer the question, its members would have faced the
electorate in their retention elections. The United States Supreme Court's
complete insulation from Florida's voters made their decision the least democratic
42 The question whether the state's constitution nonetheless constrains the legislature's
exercise of its powers was a source of some scholarly and judicial debate.
43 While an expansive version of this position might treat the selection of a state's electors
as raising purely nonjusticiable political questions, I would not go that far, since the question
whether a state's processes for selecting its electors deny an individual voter his rights under the
Federal Constitution or federal statutes surely is justiciable. See Karlan, supra note 25, at 601-
02. But to the extent that the Court is being asked to vindicate something other than individual
rights, the issue is probably better left to Congress. Elsewhere, I have argued that no individual
voter's rights were in fact vindicated by the per curiam decision in Bush v. Gore. See Pamela S.
Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE
VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 77, 82-90 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A.
Epstein eds., 2001).
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way of ending the paradigmatically democratic process of holding popular
elections.
C. Freedom from the Political Branches
The judiciary's position as one of three coordinate branches can circumscribe
its freedom of action. This raises the question of the extent to which the judiciary
ought to be free from legislative or executive control. The litigation surrounding
the presidential election raises two unique aspects of this question.
The first concerns the constraints that Article II, section 1 imposes on the
process of statutory interpretation. When it comes to statutory interpretation
generally, most courts and commentators do not think courts should be too free
from legislative control. The job of courts is to apply the statutory scheme enacted
by the legislature. While there may be disagreements about canons of
construction or the legitimacy of considering legislative history as well as text,
courts generally do not see themselves as free agents.
An exception occurs when application of a statute implicates constitutional
issues. Then state courts, like federal ones, generally see themselves as the
ultimate arbiters. Thus, state courts can strike down state statutes as
unconstitutional under both the federal and the state constitution (except to the
extent that the state constitution itself confides a particular decision to another
branch of state government). Similarly, they can construe state statutes to avoid
constitutional issues or assume that the legislature would want them to interpret
statutes in light of state constitutional values.
The litigation surrounding the presidential election raised an interesting
question about whether state courts should be less free from legislative control
when it comes to controversies over a state's electoral votes. In its initial decision
requiring the Secretary of State to defer certifying the election until several
counties could conduct manual recounts, the Florida Supreme Court relied on the
Florida Constitution to provide a canon of construction. It began by noting the
central role of the Declaration of Rights and described "[t]he right of suffrage" as
"the preeminent right contained in the Declaration." 44 It therefore proclaimed that
"[b]ecause election laws are intended to facilitate the right of suffrage, such laws
must be liberally construed in favor of the citizens' right to vote .... Technical
statutory requirements must not be exalted over fle substance of this right."45
The United States Supreme Court vacated the Florida Supreme Court's
judgment.46 It sent the case back for clarification about the extent to which the
Florida Supreme Court's construction of state law depended on the state
constitution, suggesting, but never stating outright, that if the court had used the
44 Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Hais, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1236 (Fla. 2000).
45 Id. at 1237.
46 Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).
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state constitution to reach a result that the legislature had not intended, that would
contravene Article I, section 1 of the federal constitution, which provided that
electors were to be appointed "in such Manner as the Legislature... may
direct." 47 Put concretely, if the state legislature had intended to impose either
unreasonable or unnecessary restrictions on the right to vote in presidential
elections48 or had decided to require hypertechnical compliance in order for a
vote to be counted, the state courts would have been obligated to follow their
directive, the Florida Constitution notwithstanding.
I do not have much to add to the already extensive literature about this
question. My own sense is that it seems unlikely that a state legislature, whose
members all take an oath to support the state's constitution, would have silently
chosen to enact a statute that precluded the state judiciary from looking to the
constitution to resolve unsettled interpretive questions. In other words, there was
nothing in the text, structure, or legislative history of the Florida, Election Code
that suggested that the state legislature intended to constrain judicial autonomy in
resolving presidential election contests beyond the constraints that governed all
judicial review of elections.
The other interesting question about the relationship between judicial
independence and political control concerns the United States Supreme Court.
Over time, elections constitute a significant constraint on a central aspect of
purely positive judicial autonomy-the ability of judges to realize a constitutional
vision in the face of contrary public sentiment. If the public disagrees strongly
enough with the Supreme Court's decisions, or cares deeply enough about a
contested issue of constitutional law, it can elect a president or a Congress that
shares its views and will nominate and confirm sympathetic justices. 49 Put in
terms of judicial independence, federal judges are not free to pick their
successors. That task has been confided to the political branches.
If a justice's desire to be elevated to the chief justiceship or his desire to
secure employment for his children is an illegitimate consideration, and it surely
is,50 then a desire to control the future composition of the Court is an equally (if
not more) impermissible factor in deciding a case like Bush v. Gore. But we
should distinguish taking this factor into account in deciding a particular case
from the more general concern justices may have in controlling future doctrinal
development, or even in shaping the composition of future courts. Quite often,
47 See id. at 77.
48 Presumably, if those restrictions were so unreasonable or unnecessary that they violated
the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would be
invalid as a matter of federal law.
49 Of course, this can be a somewhat imperfect process, given stealth candidates, changes
of heart, and the emergence of unanticipated pivotal issues. (For example, none of the members
of the Court at the time of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), had been asked a single question
about the contours of the constitutional right to privacy at his confirmation hearings.)
50 See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
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justices will craft opinions in order to make it harder for future courts to overturn
their rulings. As justices age, they may even discuss these issues more openly.
Consider, for example, the last paragraph of Justice Blackmun's final opinion
concerning abortion. After noting that the continued vitality of a woman's interest
in reproductive autonomy depended on a "single: vote," he stated:
I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step
down, the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue
before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice between the two
worlds will be made.51
And of course many justices time their retirements to give presidents of their own
party the chance to fill their vacancies.
To my mind, a judge's decision to time her retirement or even to focus public
attention on the issue of judicial nominations does not necessarily aggrandize
judicial power impernissibly, because it leaves in place the overall structural
checks provided by the appointments process. Thus, I am not particularly
distressed by Justice O'Connor's initial upset at Al Gore's apparent victory-only
a hopeless naif could think judges are uninterested in politics--or even her
tentative decision to stick it out for another four years to avoid giving a
Democratic president the right to nominate her successor. But I would be
outraged if a justice's desire to keep the Democrats from filling a seat on the
Court played any role in how he or she decided Bush v. Gore.
As Bruce Ackerman points out, the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v.
Gore raises an appearance, at the very least, of this sort of aggressive assertion of
judicial independence from the political branches and the political process:
[T]his time, the president has not been independently elected. He is in the White
House as a result of an unprincipled judicial decision that brought the electoral
contest to a premature end. If such a president is allowed to fill the Court, he will
be acting as an agent of the narrow right-wing majority that secured his victory in
the first place.
In our democracy, there is one basic check on a runaway Court: presidential
elections. And a majority of the justices have conspired to eliminate this check.
The Supreme Court cannot be permitted to arrange for its own succession. To
allow this president to serve as the Court's agent is a fundamental violation of the
separation of powers. It is one thing for unelected judges to exercise the
sovereign power of judicial review; it's quite another for them to insulate
themselves yet further from popular control.52
51 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
52 Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, AM. PROsPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48,
available at LEXIS, Allnews File.
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Thus, Ackerman argued that the Senate should refuse to fill any vacancies
until after the next presidential election. With that election still two years away,
no justice has yet retired.
III. BUSH V. GORE AS A MODEL OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Until now, I have been discussing judicial independence from external
constraints. But the judicial process itself also constrains judges in a variety of
ways. One of the most obvious constraints, which played some role in the
presidential election litigation, is the hierarchical relationship among courts. The
Florida Supreme Court, for example, was not free to ignore the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.53 Indeed, many observers wondered whether the
Florida Supreme Court's decision to issue its opinion on the contest-phase
recount before it responded to the United States Supreme Court's remand on the
now superseded protest-phase question of the original certification may have
contributed to the per curiam's apparent suspicion that it was dealing with a
runaway or disobedient state court.
I want to focus here, however, on two aspects of the United States Supreme
Court's opinions in Bush v. Gore that suggest the decision reflects a particularly
troubling assertion of judicial independence: freedom from "the law." By this, I
do not mean to suggest that the Court's decision was lawless in the sense that
there was no basis in the Constitution for its holding. As I have explained
elsewhere, I think the Court's decision was wrong, particularly with respect to the
remedy it ordered for the violation it found, but its legal reasoning was deeply
flawed, not wholly absent.
The first example of the Court's assertion of freedom from the law is its
decision to halt the recount altogether, rather than to remand the case to the
Florida Supreme Court for it to decide whether to conduct a constitutionally
adequate recount. In general, federal courts are not free to adopt their own
construction of state law. A state supreme court's construction constrains them.
Perhaps the per curiam's stance can be explained in part as a function of its sub
rosa embrace of the Article II, section 1 theory that, as to the selection of electors,
even a state court is not really free to construe state law but must be bound by the
precise intent of the state legislature. Even so, the per curiam and the concurrence,
which takes an even more disdainful stance as to the Florida Supreme Court's
construction of state law, never squarely explain why justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court are in a better position to divine the state legislative will-about
issues on which the state legislatures that enacted the various provisions of the
Florida Election Code never uttered a word-than the state court was. The per
curiam's explanation of why it was stopping the recount altogether, rather than
53 1 take up in a moment the question whether the United States Supreme Court was free
to ignore the Florida Supreme Court's construction of its own law.
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remanding the case to permit the Florida Supreme Court to decide how to
proceed, was remarkable for its disingenuousness. The per curiam explained its
decision as dictated by legislative intent:
The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended the State's
electors to "participat[e] fully in the federal electoral process," as provided in 3
U.S.C. § 5. [Palm Beach County Canvassing J3d. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220,
1239 (2000).]... That statute, in turn, requires that any controversy or contest
that is designed to lead to a conclusive selection of electors be completed by
December 12. That date is upon us, and there is no recount procedure in place
under the State Supreme Court's order that comports with minimal constitutional
standards. Because it is evident that any recount seeking to meet the December
12 date will be unconstitutional for the reasons we have discussed, we reverse
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida ordering a recount to proceed.54
But the Florida Supreme Court actually said something quite different. It did
not say that the state legislature intended that any contest be stopped on December
12 regardless of whether a required recount had been completed. Indeed, it was
inconceivable that a state's failure to meet the safe-harbor deadline would deprive
its electors of the right to participate fully. As long as the electors were appointed
in time to cast their ballots on the designated clay, December 18, there would be
no problem with having some slate's vote counted. 55 Other sections of the
Electoral Count Act suggest that the drop-dead date for casting a state's electoral
votes might even have been as late as the fourth Wednesday in December (in
2000, December 27)56 or January 6, when Congress actually counts the electoral
votes.57 Neither on November 27, when it extended the certification period, nor
on December 8, when it ordered the statewide recount, did the Florida Supreme
Court squarely address the state-law salience of the December 12 expiration of
the safe-harbor provision. To paraphrase a famous observation of Judge Friendly,
54 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam).
55 The safe-harbor provision seems superfluous. In most cases, there will be no dispute in
the first place about the identity of a state's electors, and the provision will never come into
play. In those cases where there is a dispute, it remains open to Congress to determine whether
a state's electors were selected in compliance with 3 U.S.C. § 5, and it is entirely likely that
proponents of a different slate will argue that the state's processes failed to comply with § 5
because they marked a departure from previously enacted law.
56 See 3 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13 (2000).
51 See id. § 15. In Hawaii, for example, following the election of 1960, the acting govemor
originally certified the Republican slate of electors on November 28. A recount was begun on
December 13. Both the Democratic and Republican slates met on December 19 (the appointed
day that year) and each certified itself. On December 30, 1960, a court declared that the
Democrats had won the election. Accordingly, the governor then certified the Democratic
electors on January 4, 1961. Congress received the certification on January 6, and Hawaii's
votes were counted. See William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral
College, 22 J. LEGIs. 145, 166 n.154 (1996).
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the United States Supreme Court was engaged in asking what the Florida courts
would think about what the Florida legislature would think about a question about
which neither of them had thought.58
Perhaps the most pervasive internal constraint on an individual judge's ability
to pursue her own ends stems from operation of precedent and stare decisis. The
obligation that judges decide like cases alike is a key guarantor that judges will
not decide cases based on the identity of the litigants (unless they can explain why
the litigants are not similarly situated). The prospect that a particular rule of law
may apply to future cases exercises some prospective constraining force as well,
since it asks judges to consider the wisdom of applying more broadly the rule they
are contemplating in a particular case.
In Bush v. Gore, however, the per curiam essentially announced its freedom
not to apply the equal protection rule it had just announced to any other case:
The recount process, in its features here described, is inconsistent with the
minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right of each voter in
the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single state
judicial officer. Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the
problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities. 59
The most generous explanation for this extraordinary paragraph is that the
majority knew that it was acting under tremendous time pressure, and was
hesitant to announce a rule that could swiffly throw into doubt the
constitutionality of a huge number of states' election systems.60 But precisely to
the extent that the Supreme Court announces that it, and the lower courts, should
feel free to decide future equal protection challenges without considering Bush v.
Gore, it creates suspicion that its decision was result-oriented. That the Court felt
free to announce this entirely new rule61 in a case with such tremendous stakes,
and then immediately to repudiate the precedential value of its decision, marks a
58 See Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960). I leave aside the
extraordinarily disdainful tone of the concurrence in discussing the state-law issues presented in
Bush v. Gore because I do not think I can improve on Justice Ginsburg's response in her
dissent. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 135-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 109.
60 Justice Stevens' dissent suggests the Court's awareness of this possibility. See id. at 124
n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the vast majority of states use standards for counting
ballots that were no more determinate than the Florida "clear intent of the voter" standard); id.
at 126 (noting that the vast majority of states also delegate to local authorities control over the
kind of voting machines used, thereby creating the same lack of uniformity that prevailed in
Florida).
61 1 have explained elsewhere why the Court's conclusion was not dictated by prior equal
protection precedents. See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection: Bush v. Gore and the Making
of a Precedent, in THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000, supra note 4, at 159, 187-94.
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staggering rejection of precedent's constraining force. As Justice Roberts
caustically observed in another voting rights case decided nearly sixty years
earlier, "the instant decision... tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into
the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only."62
IV. CONCLUSION
The litigation surrounding the presidential election of 2000 illustrates a
central point about judicial independence: we need to ask quite carefully what
constraints judges ought to be free from, and what constraints judges ought to be
bound by. In the end, judicial independence is not a single concept, but a
constellation of different sorts of autonomy. Not every assertion of judicial
autonomy is equally justifiable. Particularly when courts adopt aggressively
independent stances, we must measure assertions of judicial autonomy against the
competing claims of other actors within our system of democratic self-
government. In the election of 2000, it turns out that the Supreme Court of the
United States was in fact too free.
62 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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